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HOMOSEXUAL DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
Gary R. Siniscalco*
Although homosexuals traditionally have faced severe religious and social disapproval, it has been estimated that four
to five percent of all adult males are homosexual. The percentage of female homosexuals is approximately half that of
males.' Persons within this minority group are becoming increasingly assertive in their opposition to discrimination directed against them because of their sexual status.
Activism is particularly vigorous in the employment
realm, in both the public and private sectors. The purpose of
this article is to analyze recent developments in these areas,
with particular attention to the law governing private employment, for it is here that homosexuals are afforded the least legal
protection against discrimination, despite a decade of fair employment legislation.'
I.

PUBLIC SECTOR

Federal Employment
Federal employment cases can be broken down into two
categories: (a) those dealing with regular civil service employment, and (b) cases on military employment or jobs involving
national security.
Civil Service. Until recently, the United States Civil Service Commission maintained the position that "persons about
* Regional Counsel, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, San Francisco Region; B.A. 1965, Le Moyne College; J.D., 1968, Georgetown Law
Center; member, California and Virginia Bars. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.
1.

(1969);
2.
(1970),
2(a)(1)

W. POMEROY, HOMOSEXUALITY, THE SAME SEX, AN APPRAISAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY

D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 39-42 (1967).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15
as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. II, 1972). Section 2000eprovides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..
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whom there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited
others to engage in homosexual or sexually perverted acts ...,
without evidence of rehabilitation, are not suitable for federal
employment."3 As early as 1969, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia imposed severe limits on this policy, holding that it was overly broad and a denial of due process. In
Norton v. Macy,4 the court held that an otherwise competent
civil servant could not be dismissed solely on the basis of offduty homosexual conduct. A reasonably foreseeable and specific connection must be demonstrated between an employee's
potentially embarrassing conduct and the probability of detrimental impact on the efficiency of the agency. Having established such a connection, the federal agency and the Civil Service Commission must then balance that potential harm against
the loss to the government of a competent employee. 5 The
Norton court found no sufficient connection, noting that the
discharged employee was "at most an extremely infrequent
offender, who neither openly flaunts nor carelessly displays his
unorthodox sexual conduct in public."' The court concluded
that it was impermissibly arbitrary to dismiss the employee
when the potential for embarrassment to the employer agency
was minimal.'
In 1973, a federal district court in California forbade enforcement of the same policy as to current and prospective
employees, but declined to apply the anti-discrimination rule
retroactively to employees previously discharged for
homosexual conduct.' The district court rejected the
government's bald assertion that employment of such persons
would bring government service into "public contempt." Citing the balancing test set out in Norton v. Macy, the court
3. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL SUPPLEMENT (INT.) 731-71. See Note, Government
('reated Employment Disability of the Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969).
4. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Note, Government
Employment and the Homosexual, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970). A California case
on point is Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969).
5. 417 F.2d at 1167.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1973), alf'd, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975). The court cited the difficulty of discovering
members of the class of previously discharged employees. Id. at 401. See also Baker v.
Hampton, No. 2525-71 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1973); 6 CCH EMP. PRAC. DECISIONS 9043
(1974).
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reiterated Norton's admonition that the government "cannot
support a dismissal as promoting the efficiency of the service
merely by turning its head and crying 'shame.' "I Judge Zirpoli
concluded that although the overbroad rule stated in the
Federal Personnel Manual'" could not be enforced, the Commission was free to determine what particular circumstances
might justify dismissing an employee for homosexual conduct." The Civil Service Commission considered the question,
and in December, 1973, issued a bulletin advising federal agencies that, pending appeal, homosexuals would be found unsuitable for federal service only when the evidence established that
such a person's conduct affects job fitness. Unsubstantiated
conclusions as to possible embarrassment of the federal service
were to be excluded from consideration,"2 but suitability
judgments were nevertheless to be based on then-current
guidelines. Subsequently, the Civil Service regulations were
amended to delete "immoral conduct" from the list of specific
factors for disqualification for employment."
The "rational connection" test was adopted recently in
Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission;4 application of the test, however, resulted in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upholding the dismissal of a
homosexual clerk-typist employed, ironically, by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The clerk had on several occasions publicly disclosed his sexual proclivities while
identifying himself as an employee of a federal agency. Furthermore, he had, with full media coverage, applied for a license to marry another male. He was also active in a gay organization in Seattle which used his name and place of employment in connection with a symposium sponsored by the Seattle
Gay Community.' 5
9. 63 F.R.D. at 401, quoting Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167-68. (D.C. Cir.
1969).
10. See note 3 supra.
11. 63 F.R.D. at 401.
12. United States Civil Service Commission Bulletin No. 731-3 (Dec. 21, 1973).
13. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201(b) was changed and § 731.202(b) was added, so that
"criminal, dishonest or notoriously disgraceful conduct" may still be considered as
reasons for disqualification from employment, but "immoral conduct" may not. 40
Fed. Reg. 28047 (1975).
14. No. 74-2073 (9th Cir., Jan. 14, 1976). Because the employee was dismissed
prior to the issuance of the Commission bulletin in 1973 and the amendment of its
regulations, the court did not rely on them in deciding this case. See notes 12 & 13
and accompanying text supra.
15. Id., at 3.
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Distinguishing Norton v. Macy, in which the dismissed
employee had not sought to publicize his status,'" the court of
appeals concluded that the Civil Service Commission had established a rational connection between the employee's deliberately public homosexual involvement, and detriment to the
efficiency of the federal service. The Commission was not
obliged to sponsor homosexual activity, the court noted, and
was properly concerned about public confidence in the Commission and the Federal Civil Service.1
The Singer court also addressed the employee's claim that
he had been denied freedom of expression under the first
amendment. The employee relied on two cases, the first of
which had struck down a regulation prohibiting homosexual
organizations from holding social activities on a university
campus.' 8 The second case offered as support for the first
amendment argument involved a teacher whose public statements on homosexuality were held protected speech.' 9 The
court of appeals found, however, that neither of the cited cases
"involved the open and public flaunting or advocacy of homosexual conduct." 0 Applying the balancing test of Pickering v.
Board of Education," the court concluded that the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service
outweighed Mr. Singer's interest in exercising his right to advocate the homosexual cause while publicizing his connection
with a government agency."
Military and national security. Civilians working for the
Defense Department"3 or engaged in employment involving
16.
17.
1976), at
18.
19.
20.
21.

See text accompanying note 6 supra.
Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 74-2073 (9th Cir. Jan. 14,
5.
Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
No. 74-2073 (9th Cir., Jan. 14, 1976), at 18-19.
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

Lit cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possess in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.
22. No. 74-2073 (9th Cir., Jan. 17, 1976), at 9.
23. The problems facing military personnel under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice are not included in this article. An historical discussion of the treatment of
homosexuals in the armed forces is presented in Comment, Homosexuals in the
Militarv, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 465 (1968-69).
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national security are similarly protected by the government's
obligation to establish a business justification for discharging
or refusing to hire a homosexual. The court in Gayer v.
Schlesinger4 discussed the necessity of establishing a nexus
between homosexual conduct and the efficiency of the service
rendered by the employee. It held that the mere fact of the
plaintiffs' homosexuality was not sufficient to make them unsuitable and since they acknowledged their homosexuality, it
was not likely to affect their performance. The court did indicate, however, that a different standard might have to be
applied to persons in sensitive positions, in proportion to the
risks involved. 5
State and Local Government Employment
Courts have not been unwilling to protect state and local
employees from discriminatory regulations and practices, either under the first amendment" or under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 But they have been most reluctant
to extend protection to the homosexual plaintiff in the face of
alleged risks or problems perceived by the employer,2 8 particularly when the homosexual employee has engaged in overt,
public homosexual behavior.29 Even where rights have been
unconstitutionally infringed, courts hesitate to afford homosexuals the same relief available to other minority groups.
In a recent federal case arising in Oregon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an award of back pay to a dis24. Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 750.
26. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 86 (1974). See Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379
(1974), where the court rejected plaintiffs claim to right to privacy because his conduct
on the job was found to have a deleterious effect on the performance of his duties as a
house-parent for retarded minor children at a state institution.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School
No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
See note 26 supra.
29. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971). The court affirmed the
refusal to hire a homosexual activist instructor/librarian who had attracted public
attention by attempting to marry a fellow homosexual. The court viewed plaintiff's
conduct as a attempt "to foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant concept upon
his employer," and thus not legally protected. Id. at 196. The court did suggest,
however, that "clandestine" (private) homosexual conduct would warrant protection.
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charged female teacher who was an avowed homosexual."0 The
court declined, however, to require the reinstatement of the
plaintiff to her nontenured position. The majority did not feel
that the unlawful discharge was on a par with race discrimination or free speech activities, which commonly call for what the
court termed the "extraordinary equitable remedy"3 1 of reinstatement.
The dissenting judge questioned the extent to which the
monetary remedy recouped the loss suffered by the teacher,
and concluded that the decision would hardly deter similar
dismissals in the future, since any school board willing to incur
a financial penalty of a few thousand dollars remained free to
fire homosexual teachers at will.3"
As this discussion has indicated, homosexual persons employed in the public sector receive less protection against job
discrimination than members of racial minority groups or
fellow-employees whose religious or political rights are infringed, but they are at least making progress as judicial and
administrative attitudes shift toward the liberal end of the
spectrum. In the private sector, they have not fared so well.

II.

PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

Recent Cases Avoid the Problem of Homosexual
Discrimination
It was not until 1975 that the first decisions involving
homosexuality and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411
were rendered by the courts or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 4
In a case of first impression, Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,3" Judge Hill of the Northern District of Georgia
30. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th
Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 853.
32. Id. at 856 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 3-15 (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (Supp. II, 1972). See note 2 supra.
34. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as
"Commission" or EEOC) is the agency created by Congress to effectuate the goals of
Title VII. Id. § 2000e-4. It has the power to issue guidelines which interpret the statute.
Courts generally hold that the guidelines are entitled to great deference. Wetzel v.
Liberty Life Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 209 (3rd Cir. 1975).
35. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975). A black female was hired instead of
plaintiff.
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held that it was not unlawful sex discrimination for the employer to refuse to hire a male for a mail room job because he
was effeminate. The court, after discussing at length the judicial philosophy of liberal versus strict construction of statutes,
cited the Fifth Circuit's decision on long hair"6 and concluded
that "whether or not Congress should, by law, forbid discrimination based upon 'affectional or sexual preference' of an applicant, it is clear that Congress has not done so." 37 There was no
indication in this case that plaintiff was an avowed homosexual
or had been arrested for homosexual activities in violation of a
state or local ordinance. The decision not to hire apparently
was based entirely on the employer's conviction that the plaintiff was "effeminate." The court properly rejected plaintiff's
argument that to hire a female who is "effeminate" while refusing to hire a male who displays such characteristics is to discriminate because of sex. In the court's view, a male displaying
female characteristics need only receive the same treatment as
a female with "effeminate characteristics." 39 Disparate
treatment of effeminate males and masculine females would
presumably have required a finding of illegal discrimination, in
accord with the Congressional intent to insure equal employment opportunities for men and women.40
Judicial support for the Congressional policy of equal employment was clearly set forth in older, more conventional
Title VII decisions such as Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
where the United States Supreme Court held that section
703(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "requires that persons of like
qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective
of their sex."'" The Court determined that a policy of hiring
men with pre-school-age children but not women with preschool-age children was discriminatory.
36. Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd on rehearing en banc, 507 F. 2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, (N.D. Ga. 1975).
38. See Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
647, 830-32 (1966) (app. E).
39. 395 F. Supp. at 1099 n.2.
40. See text accompanying note 45 infra.
41. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
42. The Court pointed out that conflicting family obligations, if demonstrated
to be more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably
be used as evidence to show that the condition in question constituted a "bona fide
occupational qualification" under section 703(e) that is reasonably necessary to the
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Applying the Phillips rationale, the court in Jurinko v.
Edwin L. Weigand Co.43 held that a company which employed
married men but not married women had engaged in unlawful
discrimination. Since the sole variable was the sex of the applicant, the discrimination was based on sexual distinctions
alone.
In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.," the defendant airline
company's rule of not allowing stewardesses to marry, while
imposing no such restriction on male stewards or other employees similarly was deemed to be discriminatory. The Sprogis
court noted that the Congressional intent underlying Title
VII's proscription of sex discrimination in employment was "to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."4 5 This suggests that the
courts might find that Title VII offers a remedy where a homosexual plaintiff could establish employment discrimination as
between male and female homosexuals-a possibility that will
be explored later in this discussion."
A second major Title VII decision, Voyles v. Ralph K.
Davies Medical Center,4 7 involved not a homosexual but a
transsexual. The plaintiff, a female medical technician employed by a private clinic, advised her employer that she intended to undergo a sex change operation. She was discharged,
admittedly because of the prospective sex change, on the
ground that her continued employment would have a disturbing effect on both patients and co-workers. A Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California considered the
threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction and concluded, after reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, that
Congress simply had not considered the need to protect against
discrimination based on sex change or sexual preference among
males and females. The court found support for its view that
Congress had not intended to include homosexuals, transsexuals or bisexuals under Title VII in the fact that bills currently
normal operation of the business, and therefore allowable. But the Court did not
consider the record adequate for a determination of this issue. 400 U.S. at 544.
43. 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1038 (3rd Cir.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973).
44. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
45. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
46. See text accompanying notes 68-92 infra.
47. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-3808, 9th Cir.,
Dec. 22, 1975.
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are pending in Congress which would add "affectional or sexual
preference" to the statute's list of proscribed factors.48 Judge
Williams did not appear concerned with whether the defendant
did in fact apply or would have applied the same standard to
a male who sought a sex change operation. Moreover, with the
case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the proffered defense of customer or employee preference was not addressed.4"
Neither Smith nor Voyles dealt foursquare with the discrimination homosexuals face in employment. They do suggest
that courts may "duck" homosexual discrimination cases
solely on the basis that protection of homosexuals or transsexuals was not intended when Congress enacted Title VII. But if
an employer should be found to treat male homosexuals or
male transsexuals differently than their female counterparts,
the variable would be sex-which is clearly prohibited by Title
0
VII-and the protections of Title VII should be available. It
is arguable that such a situation does indeed exist, and factors
tending to prove its existence will be examined subsequently.
EEOC Opinions: A Similar Reaction in the Administrative
Forum
The EEOC, more than ten years after its inception, and
more than five years after first receiving cases involving
charges of homosexual discrimination, has finally rendered two
decisions."
In the first case, the charging party was refused employment because he was an admitted homosexual; in the second,
the same employer had discharged another employee because
he had been arrested with four others and was awaiting trial
on charges of homosexual activity. The Commission found that
it lacked jurisdiction to deal with either complaint. After ac48. 403 F. Supp. at 457. H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2667, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975.
49. 403 F. Supp. at 457. The court observed that even the current bills may be
limited only to homosexuals. Id. at 457 n.2; see 121 CONG. REC. E 1441 (daily ed. Mar.
25, 1975) (remarks of Congresswoman Abzug).
50. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
51. EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6495 (Nov. 10, 1975);
EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 2 id. 6493 (Nov. 10, 1975). The EEOC did issue a General
Counsel Opinion (M108-66) on February 2, 1966, stating that an employer does not
commit an unlawful employment practice by failing to hire or by discharging an
individual who is a homosexual. EEOC General Counsel Opinions, however, may not
be relied upon by any person other than the addressee(s). See Notice, 35 Fed. Reg.
18692 (1970).
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knowledging that there is "no definition of the term 'sex' in the
language of Title VII" and "scant evidence of what Congress
intended," the Commission noted that the Congressional debates "focused almost exclusively on disparities in employment opportunities between males and females."5 Coupling
this view of Congressional intent with the standard principle
of statutory construction that "unless there is clear legislative
expression to the contrary, words used in the statutes are to be
given their ordinary meaning," the Commission expressed the
opinion that when Congress used the word "sex" in Title VII
it was referring to gender, an immutable characteristic with
which one is born. Each of the charging parties had alleged
discrimination because of his sexual proclivities or practices
and not "because of his gender;" 3 the Commission found that
"these two concepts are in no way synonymous," 4 and concluded:
[T]here being no support in either the language or the

legislative history

. .

.

that

. .

.Congress intended to in-

clude a person's sexual practices within the meaning of the
term sex, and since . . . Respondent failed to hire [or

rehire] charging party because of his sexual practices, not
his gender, the Commission must conclude that it is without substantive jurisdiction to decide the issue.55
In support of its decision, the EEOC cited a series of appellate and district court opinions in which it had been held that
hair-length requirements imposed by employers did not constitute unlawful discrimination against males." The thrust of
these decisions was expressed most recently in Willingham v.
Macon Telegraph Co., where the court adopted the view that
52. EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6495, at 4266 (Nov.
10, 1975); EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 2 id. 6493, at 4262 (Nov. 10, 1975).
53. EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6495, at 4266 (Nov.
10, 1975); EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 2 id. 6493, at 4263 (Nov. 10, 1975).
54. EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP.
6495, at 4266 (Nov.
10, 1975); EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 2 id. 116493, at 4263 (Nov. 10, 1975).
55. EEOC Decision No. 76-75, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6495, at 4266-67 (Nov.
10, 1975); EEOC Decision No. 76-67, 2 id. 1 6493, at 4263 (Nov. 10, 1975).
56. Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.),
rev'd on rehearingen banc, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. California Land
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v.
Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.,
481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wansganz v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 9 CCH EMP. PRAc.
DECISIONS
10,000 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Bujel v. Burman Food Stores, Inc., 9 CCH EMP.
PRAC. DECISIONS 9996 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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when employers make distinctions in their employment practices between men and women on the basis of something other
than immutable characteristics or protected rights-that is, on
characteristics such as grooming standards-they do not inhibit employment opportunities in violation of Title VII. 57 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded that Congressional intent was to direct Title VII towards characteristics
which a job applicant, otherwise qualified, has no power to
alter.5"
The Commission's use of the hair-length decisions to support its inference that homosexuality is a mutable proclivity or
practice and therefore not within the protection afforded by
Title VII arguably is a demonstration of fallacious reasoning;
it is at least a substantial retreat from its own earlier interpretations of Title VII, wherein the Commission showed little reluctance to assert jurisdiction based on "mutable" factors.
While it may be correct to assume that long hair is not a
significant status or condition, it is simplistic to consider that
one's sexual proclivities or preferences are as easily chosen or
controllable as one's hairstyle.5" Theories as to the causes and
contributing factors of homosexuality are not in accord. Some
posit that homosexuality results from physical abnormalities
such as an endocrine imbalance, while others hold that sexual
preference is the product of environmental factors encountered
before, during, or even after maturity. 0 Given this psychiatric,
biological and social ignorance, it seems unreasonably arbitrary for the Commission to conclude that homosexuality is a
"preference" sufficiently mutable as to fall outside the scope
of Title VII. The characteristic of being homosexual would
seem to fit within the category of socio-biologicalenvironmental factors which the courts have dealt with in other
contexts, such as race. 6'
57. 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. For analyses of hair-length and general appearance requirements, see
Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-"Sex-Plus" and the
BFOQ, 23 HAST. L.J. 55, 62-65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Oldham]; Note, Employer
Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 So. CAL.
L. REV. 965 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Employer Dress and Appearance
Codesl.
60. These theories and their sources are discussed in Kovarsky, Fair
Employment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. L.Q. 527, 527-78 (1971).
61. See discussion in text accompanying note 68 infra.
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Even if homosexuality is, for legal purposes, to be considered a less-than-immutable status, it should be noted that the
Commission in the past has consistently held that other characteristics which can be described as mutable are protected by
Title VII. Despite several contrary decisions by federal appellate courts," the Commission had, until recently, steadfastly
held that employer hair-length regulations applying only to
males constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of
Title VII. 3 Given the growing weight of judicial authority to the
contrary, 4 the Commission presently has suspended the processing of sex discrimination charges arising from rules forbidding male employees to wear their hair in long styles. But it has
not been reluctant to assert its jurisdiction in other "mutable"
areas; sex discrimination has been found when employers have
refused to hire males with beards and moustaches,5 and race
discrimination when blacks have been penalized for wearing
"afros" as an expression of racial pride and
heritage."
It is apparent, however, that the present state of the law,
as reflected in recent court and administrative decisions, does
not provide a clear means of redress for the homosexual who
has suffered employment discrimination in the private sector.
The following analysis offers an approach which may be viable
within the present constraints of the law.
III.

THE IMPACT THEORY OF

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A

SUGGESTED APPROACH

With respect to claims of homosexual employment discrimination, neither the district court in Smith 7 nor the EEOC
actually examined the results of the allegedly anti-homosexual
employment practices. But in other contexts, courts have
struck down seemingly neutral employment policies which in
practice have an unequal impact on one sexual, racial or ethnic
group. The leading authority in this area is Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.," in which the United States Supreme Court disal62. See note 56 supra.
63. See 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 421.
64. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
65. EEOC Decision No. 72-1380, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6364 (1971).
66. EEOC Decision No. 71-2444, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. REP. 6240 (1971).
67. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See
text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Oldham, supra note 59, at 71; Note, Employer Dress
and Appearance Codes, supra note 59, at 989.
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lowed an employer's policy of requiring a high school diploma
or a specified score on intelligence.tests as a condition of employment in or transfer between jobs at its plant. The Court
found that this practice, although equally applied to white and
black employees, had an adverse effect on blacks, and was
discriminatory because the employer failed to show the relation
of diploma or test score to successful job performance.
Since Griggs, other courts have found that hiring or promotion policies based on arrest, conviction or garnishment history, where a greater percentage of blacks than whites suffer
garnishments 9 or are arrested for 70 or convicted of crimes,7 ' are
discriminatory in the absence of a showing of business necessity.
In other cases in the Griggs line, neutral practices with
adverse ethnic7" and sexual73 results have been declared unlawful under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate jobrelatedness. For example, a 150-pound minimum body weight
requirement imposed by an employer, although neutral on its
face, has been held discriminatory in practice.74 In a more obvious case, an employer's income-protection plan which covered all disabilities except pregnancy and treated maternity
leave differently than other types of short-term disability leave
has been categorized as sex discrimination.7"
As both the Smith court7" and the EEOC77 recently noted,
Congress devoted little attention to defining the precise meaning of the word "sex" as it is used in Title VII. Yet under the
69. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
70. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd as
modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
71. Green v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. United States v. Inspiration Consolidation Copper Co., 6 CCH EMP. PRAC.
DecisiONS 8918 (D. Ariz. 1973). High school education and testing requirements were
found to have an adverse impact on citizens with Spanish surnames and American
Indians.
73. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text infra.
74. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 96 (W.D. Ky. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d
939 (6th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed sub nom., AAAIW Local 862 v. Ford Motor
Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 3637 (U.S. May 25, 1975). But see Comstock v. Eastern Airlines, 10
E.P.D. 11 10,392 (E.D. Va. May 16, 1975), where the court denied preliminary relief
since plaintiff failed to make a showing that defendant's weight restrictions had an
adverse impact on women.
75. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted,
421 U.S. 987 (1975).
76. 395 F. Supp. at 1101. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
77. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
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adverse impact theory, at least, the courts have interpreted
Title VII as providing approximately the same scope, degree
and type of protection for sexual groups that it does for racial,
ethnic or religious groups, whether the discrimination be open
and obvious, or apparent only after close examination of the
challenged policy's impact.
Thus it seems clear that if a "neutral" policy of discharging or not hiring homosexuals proves to have an adverse impact
on males or females as a class, that policy should be proscribed.
The following analysis suggests how future court and Commission decisions might deal adequately with charges of employment discrimination against homosexuals, in accord with Congressional intent as defined in Griggs.
Establishinga Prima Facie Case
To make a prima facie case under Griggs, a plaintiff would
first have to meet the burden of showing the necessary adverse
impact of an apparently neutral policy against hiring any
homosexual persons. Available data indicates that an adverse
impact on male homosexuals may well exist. For example, one
study in Los Angeles indicated that of 468 persons arrested on
misdemeanor charges for homosexual activity, 466 were male
and only two were female."M An employer's policy, therefore, of
discharging or refusing to hire persons who have been arrested
and/or convicted of homosexual activity would clearly affect
male homosexuals disproportionately.
The availability of draft and military service records to
employers also makes the male homosexual more vulnerable
than his female counterpart. Although males are no longer required to register, those who registered in the past and were
determined to be homosexual were regularly given a 4F rating.
Until 1974, it was relatively easy for an employer to gain access
to a prospective employee's Selective Service file; a broadly
worded clause in an employment application signed by a job
applicant was routinely regarded by the Selective Service as
sufficient consent to allow disclosure of the applicant's records
at the employer's request. 9 The requirement that a registrant's
78. Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical
Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County,
13 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
647, 825 (1966).
79. In discussing the consent requirement, the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights noted that the Selective Service System rather coyly
stated that it
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consent be obtained for disclosure of his records was given some

force with the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974,80 since the
Selective Service must comply with its provisions." The Act

also forbids the Defense Department to release veterans' serv82
ice records without the consent of the individual concerned.
Employers, however, are still free to ask applicants for a release, and access to military records, in the case of homosexuals, impacts almost exclusively on males.
The public's view of homosexuals may also be shown to
have an adverse impact on males in the job market. Most people object to effeminate behavior in males, or to overt physical
contact between males,83 while similar conduct between females is tolerated if not actually condoned by the public, employers, and co-workers. "Tomboy" behavior in girls is not
only generally accepted, but may even be viewed favorably by
parents and others as indicative of healthy "female" aggressiveness. "Sissy" behavior in boys, on the other hand, is rarely
tolerated; "equality" is still routinely defined in terms of male
characteristics.
Where a plaintiff is seeking to establish a prima facie case,
it may be possible to establish, through testimony of experts
or of co-workers, a greater or more pervasive disapprobation of
effeminate males than of masculine females. Thus, an employer is more likely to have detected or received complaints
about the effeminate male, and even a neutral policy of discharging only those persons against whom such complaints are
received is likely to affect homosexual males disproportionately, as compared with homosexual females.
The impact approach permits the Commission and the
courts to view the problem in male/female terms rather than
honored registrants' consent to having their files examined by prospective employers
without questioning the motive or reason for giving consent. The Subcommittee interpreted this response to mean:
In other words, by merely signing a broadly worded employment or (presumably) credit application a registrant may have been deemed to waive
the confidentiality of his Selective Service Records.
STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3133-34 (Comm.
Print 1974).
80. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West Supp. 1976).
81. 32 C.F.R. § 1608.4(b) (1975).
82. Department of Defense Rules & Reg. 286a.8(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 55520 (1975).
83. Yet, among some ethnic groups such physical activities are common and,
indeed, a long-accepted custom among family and friends.
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in terms of gender versus sexual preference. But demonstrating
impact is only half the problem. Under Griggs, the burden then
shifts to the employer to demonstrate a business necessity for
imposing a policy against homosexual employees.
Employer Defenses
The employer's defenses are likely to be grounded on one
or more of several factors: (1) job efficiency or suitability; (2)
employee morale or customer preference; and (3) national security. Factors (1) and (2) may sometimes overlap, but the cases
appear to suggest that only the first will carry much weight,
and then only in specific fact situations. The courts have continually rejected sweeping, unsupported claims of public employers that the mere fact of homosexuality affects suitability
or job performance." But where the defendant can show some
actual or potential risk of a homosexual actively advocating
unorthodox views, specifically where children or students are
concerned, the courts seem to be more likely to deny relief.85
"Socially repugnant" views which plaintiff sought overtly to
impose on his employer persuaded the court in McConnell v.
Anderson" to find that the university's decision not to hire the
plaintiff was justified. The Fourth Circuit, in Acanfora v.
Board of Education,"8 held that the plaintiff's practice of publicly advocating community acceptance of homosexuals was
protected since it did not impair his ability to teach, and he
had stressed that he would not discuss his views on sexuality
with his students. The court found, however, that the plaintiff
lacked standing to contest his transfer since he had made false
statements in his employment application concerning prior
affiliation with a homosexual organization.
In analogous Title VII cases where employers have raised
employee morale or customer preference as a defense, the
courts have uniformly remained unimpressed by the claims.
The Fifth Circuit, in Diaz v. Pan American Airlines,"
5
rejected
84. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See note 4 supra.
Society
for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1973). See text
accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
85. Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512
F.2d 850 (9th
Cir. 1975); Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d
379 (1974).
See note 26 supra.
86. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971). See note
29 supra.
87. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419
U.S. 836 (1974).
88. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
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defendant's claim that only females could work as flight cabin
attendants because the majority of its customers were men and
they preferred female attendants. An attempt by a school district to remove an unmarried pregnant teacher because of the
potential effect such a "role model" might have on students
has also failed, though the case is currently on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court." Alleged poor employee morale
has been held not to be a proper business justification for refusing to make reasonable accommodation to the requirements of
a particular employee's religion."0
Employers might assert as a defense the fear that homosexuals, unlike males or females as a class, will harass or intimidate customers or co-workers. It is unlikely that the courts
would be persuaded by such speculation without actual evidence of such activity." Courts should balance the interest to
be protected. Purely speculative dangers and the prejudices of
customers and employers must be weighed against the right to
equal employment which Congress sought to protect.
The national security defense is restricted to military and
defense-related activities and to certain security-sensitive public and private positions. While courts may be more willing to
give the government or a private employer the benefit of the
doubt as to security needs, here, too, a mere claim of nonsuitability will be denied as grounds for dismissal."
CONCLUSION

Only in recent years has the problem of employment dis-

crimination against homosexuals been addressed. Satisfactory
89. Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D.
Miss. 1973), afJ'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1975). Note the lower court's rejection of the business justification rationale in
McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d .93 (8th Cir. 1971), which defendant sought to
apply.
90. Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., No. 75-1221 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 1975),
citing Cummins v. Parker, 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1975).
91. Safransky v. State Personnel Bd., 62 Wis. 2d 464, 215 N.W.2d 379 (1974).
See note 26 supra.
92. In Ulrich v. Laird, No. 203-71 (D.D.C., Sept. 28, 1971), consolidated and
aff'd, Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973), plaintiffs security clearance
was cancelled after he admitted he was a homosexual, but refused to respond to
questions designed to elicit details of his homosexual lifestyle and friendships. Because
plaintiff admitted his homosexuality, and because he intended to maintain his lifestyle, the court concluded that absent proof of a nexus between homosexuality and
plaintiff's ability to protect secrets, he could not be deprived of his security clearance.
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solutions have by no means been reached.
Homosexuals presently are afforded more legal protection
if they enter the public service. Current case law indicates
some liberalization of social and judicial attitudes, but despite
the fact that the federal government no longer classifies homosexuality as an "immoral" condition, 3 it will countenance the
employment of homosexuals only so long as they keep their
status and their activities discretely out of the public eye.
Individuals employed in the private sector are still without
any significant legal recourse against discriminatory practices.
The meaning of "sex" in Title VII has yet to be clarified by
Congress," 4 and the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have narrowly construed the statute so as
to avoid any meaningful inquiry into the problem of homosexual discrimination in this area."
Although a number of private companies are beginning to
announce their willingness to hire homosexuals," it is doubtful
that any broad-based reform will occur without some increased
governmental prodding. To further that end in the judicial
forum, the adverse impact analysis is offered as a possible
means of alleviating-albeit in a limited and partial fashion-the problems faced by homosexual employees and prospective employees.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 33-66 supra.
TIME, Sept. 8, 1975, at 32.

